Since Ukraine struck Russian Wildberries warehouses in July, Russia has hit 570 Ukrainian warehouses, according to military analyst Clement Molin. Molin argues the exchange exposed Ukraine's civilian logistics as Russian strikes on Black Sea ports intensified during the harvest.
The Warehouse Campaign
Molin's summer assessment is severe. Kyiv made decisions its defences and economy could not absorb. Ukraine also struck Black Sea commercial vessels. Russia hit supermarkets and ports. Civilian supply chains and trade were disrupted.
Russia was already striking Ukraine's ports and needed no excuse. Responsibility for its attacks rests with Moscow. Molin's narrower point: Kyiv was unprepared. Black Sea ports were cut off and repeatedly bombarded. Damage to storage and retail squeezed an economy reliant on moving goods.
A warehouse hit in Russia and one in Ukraine have different consequences for a civilian economy under invasion. Kyiv has every right to strike Russia. It must calculate what it can protect when Russia responds.
The Air-Defence Squeeze
Russia's growing supply of deep-strike weapons, including Geran-4 and Banderol systems and munitions for Iskander and S-400, met a shortage of Ukrainian interceptors. Near-daily attacks on Kyiv strained defence production and civilian economic activity.
Molin points to decisions inside Ukraine's control. Two warehouses hit near Kyiv this summer held substantial ammunition stocks, including air-defence missiles. Keeping them in vulnerable facilities magnified losses when interceptors were scarce. An attack on a publicly announced military exhibition killed Ukrainian drone-industry workers. Molin argues the toll among specialists and defence-industry personnel far exceeded the official figure. Lost expertise, capacity and missiles will matter in the months ahead.
Politics and Command
The military strain coincided with a political rupture. Zelensky's sudden dismissal of Mykhailo Fedorov drew criticism, as did corruption affairs around Kyrylo Budanov and his refusal to speak with Ukrainian journalists despite foreign interviews. Fedorov then called for an election and accepted work abroad, hurting his standing despite popular support.
Mykhailo Drapatyi's appointment as commander-in-chief offered hope, not instant repair. His task was to stabilise the Donbas after its sharp deterioration in August. Russian gains demanded attention, though Molin cautioned against declaring a return to an offensive on the scale of 2024 or 2025. Ukraine's position in the south improved, and its drone strikes continued.
A Hard Winter to Prepare For
Molin warned of a difficult winter in the rear if attacks caused widespread electricity and heating shortages, and raised the possibility of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians leaving for Poland and the wider EU. Winter could hinder Russian infiltration at the front, but offers little comfort to families without heat or power. Protecting homes, industry and supply routes sustains the army.
Russia has vulnerabilities too. Its strained economy and damaged refineries have brought fuel shortages to parts of the country. Both sides' deep strikes reach beyond their targets. Ukraine must impose costs on Russia without exposing essential systems to damage it cannot quickly replace.
The warehouse tally, the port campaign, the interceptor shortage and the worsening Donbas position belong in the same assessment, even when the findings make different audiences angry.
Molin says he has faced criticism from Ukrainians over his earlier account of these decisions and from Russians over his more recent coverage of Russian losses. He describes his work as OSINT-based monitoring that returns to a subject repeatedly, rather than treating one set of strikes or losses as the whole war.
